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In reversing, the Appellate Court neither discussed the quoted lease
provisions nor related the facts which describe the character of the
breach.81 Because the agreement to make improvements related to the
original two tracts only, while the profit evidence admitted related to the
complete business, the court held that the evidence was uncertain and,
therefore, inadmissible for proving the loss.82 This appears to be the
first case in which a defendant's responsibility for destruction of a
profitable business was not doubted and yet a recovery of damages for
the loss of profits has been denied. It was clear that there was no addi-
tional evidence the plaintiff could have produced to prove his loss. The
moral may be that the drafters of contracts should give more attention
to liquidated damages provisions in order to preclude courts from in-
voking a ban against the profit interest. The holding is a departure
from the Hudnut case in which the test of certainty was used to deter-
mine the probability that a business successful in the past would be suc-
cessful in the future.83 As such it was a test of the fact of damage and
not one of mathematics or of measurement.
Under the certainty requirement the question of liability for lost
profits can become one which is decided without reference to responsi-
bility for the damage. The tendency of appellate courts to overlook facts
which induce adherence to a theory of compensation, while vindicating
the desirability of some check upon the jury's discretion, results in giving
a wrongdoer the benefit of any doubt which surrounds the damages
question. Greater emphasis is placed upon the courts' problem in review
than upon the purpose of the damages remedy.
THE-NEW UNION SHOP PROVISION IN THE RAILWAY
LABOR ACT
For many years union security measures were unknown and to a
considerable extent unwanted in the railroad industry, but in 1951 the
Railway Labor Act was amended to permit union shop agreements be-
plaintiff's highly advantageous contract; a profitable business; the subsequent leasing
of the property to plaintiff's competitor. Id. at 3-9.
81. See note 80 supra.
82. "[T]here was not any evidence given to the jury by which they could, with
any degree of certainty, have made any estimate with a degree of accuracy as to what
part of the profits from the whole . . . were attributable to that part consisting of
items one and two." Indianapolis Rys. v. Terminal Motor Inn, Inc., 112 N.E.2d 596,
599 (Ind. App. 1953).
83. See note 30 supra.
NOTES
tween carriers and railroad labor organizations.' These agreements had
been illegal since 1934 when the RLA was extensively amended to set up
the present adjustment and mediation procedure and to prevent carrier
interference with the voluntary organization of employees.2 One of the
major purposes of this 1934 revision was to rid the industry of company
unions3 which then negotiated almost twenty-five percent of the labor
agreements affecting mainly non-operating employees.' The company
union was a device the employer used to organize employees and control
their policies and practices, union officials usually being selected by rail-
road management. To eliminate competition from standard unions,
membership in the company union was often a requirement of employ-
ment. The chances for any real collective bargaining were limited since
the union was dominated by the carrier.5 Although one of the standard
railroad unions had a few union security agreements in 1934, the prac-
tice was not widespread.' It was evident that the then proposed amend-
ments to the RLA would prevent any union shop agreements in the fu-
ture. Some unions attempted to have the bill changed to ban union
shops only with respect to company dominated unions, but the Congress
decided that compulsory unionism either by the employer or the standard
unions was undesirable.7
Freed from interference by the carriers and aided by the new media-
tion and union certification procedure, the standard unions grew and
prospered. These unions are organized on a craft basis of which there
1. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (11th) (1952).
The companion to the union shop in the 1951 amendment was the checkoff provi-
sion. The checkoff is a payroll deduction by the employer for periodic union dues,
initiation fees and assessments. The statute provides that fines and penalties will not
be included and that the employee must furnish a written assignment to the employer
before the checkoff is effective. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152
(11th) (b) (1952). Little interest has been shown in the checkoff since the passage
of the bill. 20 NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD ANN. REP. 9 (1954).
2. Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164
(1952).
3. 78 CoNG. REc. 12554 (1934).
4. In 1935 company unions or system associations constituted 23.7% of the total
labor agreements; 24.1% of the total employees were in company unions, but only 0.8%
of these employees were in operating crafts. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTIcs, DEP'T
OF LABOR, BULL. No. 634, CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPANY UNIONs 1935 at 58, 59 (1937).
5. For a discussion of company unions in the railroad industry see The Nation,
Jan. 8, 1936, p. 48; DUNN, COMPANY UNIONS 90-147 (1927).
6. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen had percentage contracts on 23 of the
140 class I railroads. These contracts provided that at least 75, 85, or 100 percent, as
the case may be, of the yard trainmen and switchmen must belong to the Brotherhood.
Letter from the Federal Coordinator of Transportation to the Chairman of the Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives, June 7, 1934,
reproduced in 78 CONG. REc. 12391 (1934).
7. 78 CONG. REC. 12390-98 (1934).
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are two main types, the operating unions8 and the non-operating unions.'
Many of the unions are organized as brotherhoods or fraternal orders,"0
and most of them hold closed meetings. 1 Selective membership prac-
tices require a heavy majority of votes for admission. 2 The operating
brotherhoods are among the oldest, wealthiest, and most exclusive labor
unions in the country. 3 Railroad labor leadership has been noted at
times for its self-reliance, conservatism, 4 and restraint in political af-
fairs. 5 The brotherhoods take pride in the fact that their strength is
due to carefully selected members proud of their trade and desirous of
assisting in the promotion of labor unionism." Voluntary union mem-
bership is encouraged by informally excluding any non-member from
participating in the national grievance procedure. The National Rail-
road Adjustment Board which is the arbiter of labor grievances consists
of eighteen representatives of the standard unions and eighteen em-
ployer representatives." If the labor members vote not to hear a non-
member, a procedural deadlock results. Since there is no judicial review
in this instance, the deadlock is an effective means of withholding any
remedy.'8
The operating brotherhoods have never been as strong in advocat-
ing the union shop as have the non-operating groups, 9 chiefly because
of the former's great strength" and the complete acceptance by the car-
8. Including engineers, firemen, hostlers, conductors, trainmen, and switchmen.
9. Including railroad shop trades, carmen, telegraphers, clerks, porters, mainte-
nance men, freight handlers, tower and signal men, dispatchers, and dining car em-
ployees.
10.- Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce House of
Representatives on H.R. 7789, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 119 (1950).
11. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare United States Senate on S. 3295, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 157 (1950).
12. Hearings, supra note 10, at 92.
13. For an early history of the operating brotherhoods see TONER, THE CLOSED
SHOP 93-95 (1941). In 1949 the trainmen's brotherhood was the wealthiest labor organ-
ization in the nation, with the firemen's brotherhood second and the engineers' and con-
ductors' near the top. Business Week, Nov. 19, 1949, p. 114.
14. Railway Age, April 1, 1950, p. 39.
15. Railway Age, Jan. 21, 1950, p. 42.
16. Transcript of Proceedings of the National Railway Labor Panel Emergency
Board, 5358 (1943).
17. 44 STAT. 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1952).
18. For a complete discussion and review of this board see Comment, 18 U. CHI.
L. REV. 303 (1951) ; Northrup and Kahn, Railroad Grievance Machinery: A Critical
Analysis, 5 InD. & LAB. REL. REV. 365, 540 (1952).
19. However the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, which competes with the
switchmen's union and the conductors' organization, requested a union shop amendment
to the RLA in 1947. Hearings Before the Committee,on Education and Labor House of
Representatives On Amendnwnts to the National Labor Relations Act, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, at 1552 (1947).
20. For a history of the reasons for the operating unions' strength and lack of
interest in a union shop see TONER, THE CLOSED SHOP 93-114 (1941).
NOTES
rier of these groups as the employees' bargaining agents.2 A union
shop in the operating crafts presents a distinctive problem because of
the nature of the work. A man must serve an apprenticeship as a fire-
man or a trainman before he can be promoted to an engineer or a con-
ductor. Depending on his seniority and the needs of the carrier he may
alternate between the junior and senior jobs while building up enough
seniority to make his promotion permanent." A union shop would com-
plicate this practice for the employer, union, and employee. Jurisdic-
tional disputes might result from two unions requiring a certain em-
ployee to be a member, or the man might have to join two unions to
avoid losing his job or brotherhood insurance benefits.23
To remedy the difficulty a special paragraph was added to the 1951
union shop bill allowing men in the operating crafts to fulfill union shop
requirements by belonging to any one of the standard national unions.24
After addition of this protective provision all of the operating brother-
hoods except the engineers supported the union shop amendment.25 Four
years after the amendment, however, there are still few of these agree-
ments among the operating crafts."8  The Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers feared new engineers would remain in the firemen's brother-
hood because all inducement to join the engineers' brotherhood would
be lost.27 All the operating brotherhoods are traditional rivals for mem-
bers whose jobs overlap craft lines. They try to make membership more
attractive by bargaining for higher wages and better working condi-
21. Despres, The Collective Agreement for the Union Shop, 7 U. CHI. L. REv. 24,
53 (1939).
22. Hearings, supra note 11, at 316.
23. Trainmen News, Jan. 8, 1951, p. 2.
24. 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152(11th) (c) (1952). If an
employee in the operating crafts belongs to a union which is not one of the national
standard unions and is not the bargaining agent, he may be subject to discharge under
a union shop contract. The National Railroad Adjustment Board decides whether or
not a union is national in scope. Pigott v. Detroit, T. & I. R.R., 221 F.2d 736
(6th Cir. 1955); United Railroad Operating Crafts v. Pennsylvania R.R., 212 F.2d 938
(7th Cir. 1954); United Railroad Operating Crafts v. Northern P. Ry., 208 F.2d 135
(9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 929 (1954) ; Johns v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 118
F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ill. 1954), aff'd per curiain, 347 U.S. 964 (1954) all held that the
Board's determination is not subject to the court's jurisdiction even though five of the
ten members of the operating crafts adjustment board were members of rival unions
to the plaintiff's organization.
25. 96 CONG. REc. 16330 (1950). Previous to this the four large operating unions
had written to the Senate Democratic Policy Committee in opposition to the union shop
bill stating that "'this is clearly an attempt on the part of the non-operating organi-
zations to pass legislation that would be detrimental to the membership of the operat-
ing railway labor organizations, and we earnestly urge you and our other friends in the
Senate to oppose the adoption of this bill.'" Traffic World, Sept. 30, 1950, p. 47.
26. 20 NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD ANN. REP. 9 (1954).
27. 96 CONG. REc. 16321 (1950).
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tions.2" If one brotherhood succeeds in recruiting more than half the
members of a certain craft, it may supersede a rival brotherhood as
bargaining agent. 9
The non-operating labor organizations are split down craft lines
and usually cooperate as a group in their lobbying and collective bar-
gaining." They have generally been the strongest advocates of the union
shop. Non-operating unions did most of their original organizing dur-
ing the first World War but lost heavily to company unions after their
unsuccessful strike in 1922."' By 1942 non-operating organizations
combined to request union shop contracts in connection with a nation-
wide wage increase demand."2 They claimed need for union security as
protection from rival CIO unions who were attempting to organize rail-
road workers."3 The request was rejected by the 1943 Presidential
Emergency Board, disapproval being based upon the Attorney General's
opinion that union shop agreements were illegal under the RLA34 and
the Board's view that the non-operating unions representing ninety
percent of the non-operating employees needed no increase in member-
ship or protection from rival labor organizations.35
In 1947, after the trainmen's brotherhood had requested a union
shop amendment to the RLA, the Railway Labor Executives' Associa-
tion reported to Congress their opposition to any union shop proposal.
The Association at that time represented all of the railroad unions ex-
cept the trainmen's and engineers' brotherhoods.3" By 1950, however,
the Association reversed its position and gave wholehearted support to
the proposed amendment.3" This may have been due to a slight loss in
membership after the war and increased CIO activity in the railroads."
28. For example, conductors are eligible for membership in the trainmen's brother-
hood, and trainmen may join the conductors' union. See Levinson, Railway Labor Act-
The Record of a Decade, 3 LAB. L.J. 13, 27 (1952). For a view on why this rivalry
discouraged union shops see Railway Age, April 1, 1950, p. 39.
29. Hearings, supra note 10, at 172.
30. Most of the non-operating unions are affiliated with the American Federation
of Labor. The operating brotherhoods are all independent. INTERNATIONAL LABOR
DIRECTORY Xxxvi-xl (1950).
31. Hearings, supra note 10, at 3.
32. Transcript, supra note 16, at 5325-5326.
33. Transcript, supra note 16, at 5358-5386.
34. 40 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 255-256 (1942). The Attorney General reviewed the
precise wording of the statute and the legislative intent in reaching his decision.
35. Transcript of Proceedings of the National Railway Labor Panel Emergency
Board, Supplemental Report to the President, 28 (1943).
36. Hearings, supra note 19, pt. 5, at 3724.
37. Hearings, supra note 11, at 3.
38. The CIO claimed 20 out of 25 elections conducted by the National Mediation
Board in 1949. 1949 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE
CIO 82. Subsequently the United Railroad Workers of America, CIO, again claimed
increases over AFL rivals. 1951 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH CONSTITUTIONAL CONVEX-
TION OF THE CIO 109.
NOTES
In the industries covered by the Labor Management Relations Act union
shops were much desired by the employees as shown by the successful
union shop elections. 9 The union representatives extolled the advan-
tages of union security at the committee hearings. Under them carriers
could be sure that all employees were taking part in union policy mak-
ing,4" contracts would meet with the approval of a greater number of
workers, there would be improved morale, union raiding would be re-
duced, unions would be better able to comply with labor contracts, and
there would be fewer individual grievances." In addition the union
leaders pointed out that the reason for elimination of the union shop
privilege in 1934, the problem of the company union, was no longer a
threat to legitimate collective bargaining.42
Employers are required to give non-union employees the same
benefits that union members receive under the contract. The certified
bargaining agent is required to equally represent all 'employees in his
craft regardless of union membership. 3 Labor leaders wanted non-
union employees, or, in union terminology, "free riders" or "no bills,"
as well as the large number of seasonal workers, to be required to join
a union and help pay for the benefits received from expensive bar-
gaining and lobbying activities and elaborate grievance procedure.44
The employers had been opposed to all amendments made to the
1926 RLA. They did not want to lose company unions,45 and are still
dissatisfied with the 1934 procedure for settling labor disputes.4" In
1950 management opposition to the union shop amendment was vigorous.
Plagued by a wave of post-war labor disputes" the carriers did not favor
legislation which would give a powerful group a chance to bargain for
even greater strength.4 They saw no new conditions which would jus-
tify a change in the 1934 open shop provision.49 The carriers felt that
the employee who is free to quit the union represents the best incentive
to responsible union leadership. Union leaders would have to satisfy
39. Union shop elections were required by the LMRA for four years, 1947-1951.
During this time 91.4% of those voting for a union shop, and this was 77.5% of those
eligible to vote. Labor Information Bull., December, 1951, p. 11.
40. The employee who was refused membership in the union, of course, could not
take part. See p. 158 infra.
41. Hearings, supra note 10, at 11.
42. Hearings, supra note 11, at 13.
43. Steele v. Louisville & N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) ; Graham v. Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 338 U.S. 232 (1949).
44. Hearings, supra note 11, at 15, 16.
45. 78 CoNG. REc. 12372 (1934).
46. Hearings, supra note 11, at 321.
47. For a review of railroad labor disputes 1941-1951 see Levinson, supra note 28.
48. Hearings, supra note 11, at 156.
49. Hearings, supra note 11, at 314.
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the average member or be faced with loss of his membership and finan-
cial support. Conversely, when union chiefs obtain a union shop con-
tract, they no longer need fear loss of membership and are apt to become
tyrannical."0 The much regulated carrier was very much opposed to a
non-regulated union that could force membership on all employees.5 The
RLA contains none of the provisions for regulating labor unions that
are found in the LMRA
Employers also feared that if all their supervisory, employees were
forced into unions under a union shop contract, the loyalty of these
minor officials would be transferred from them to the labor organiza-
tions. 5' Labor representatives already claimed a substantial number of
supervisors as members, however, and the brotherhoods contended that
a man could be both a good supervisor and a good union member.5" The
unions point proudly to high railroad officials who came up through
the ranks and still retain their union membership. 5
Congress decided that there was no substantial reason to deny rail[
road workers the right to establish a union shop. Industries covered
by the LMRA, including many railroad competitors, had been allowed
by statute to make union shop agreements since 1935. The carriers'
argument did not convince the legislators that railroad organizations
should be treated differently with respect to union security.56 The ex-
50. Railway Age, Feb. 25, 1952, p. 38.
51. Hearings, supra note 11, at 161.
52. One of the policies of the LMRA is to prevent obstruction to the free flow
of commerce by eliminating forms of industrial unrest practiced by-some labor organi-
zations. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952). Subchapters II
and III of the LMRA do not apply to employers and employees covered by the RLA.
49 STAT. 450 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2) (3) (1952) ; 61 STAT. 156 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 182 (1952). Consequently, the railroad unions are exempted from the
jurisdiction of the NLRB. They are not required to file copies of their constitutions,
annual reports, or non-communist affidavits by officers. They do not have to answer
for unfair labor practices by labor organizations. Railroad unions are not subject to
strike injunctions. The only duty of railroad employees is to exert every reasonable
effort to make agreements and settle disputes. 44 STAT. 577 (1934), as amended, 45
U.S.C. § 152(lst) (1952).
53. An employer under the LMRA may exempt his supervisors from all aspects of
collective bargaining, including the union shop. 49 STAT. 457 (1935), as amended, 29
U.S.C. § 164(a) (1952).
54. Hearings, supra note 10, at 252.
55. Hearings, supra note 10, at 250.
56. Carriers' opposition did not end with the passage of the Amendment. After
enactment of the union shop amendment the non-operating unions immediately demanded
nation-wide bargaining for union shop contracts. The railroads 'refused, and the
mediation board referred the dispute to a Presidential Emergency Board. The unions
could not strike because in 1951 the railroads were under federal control. The emer-
gency board in 1952 recommended that the railroads grant union shops. 18 NATIONAL
MEDIATION BOARD ANN. REP. 10, 47 (1952). By 1953 the non-operating unions had over
800,000 employees in union shops. 19 NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD ANN. REP. 10
(1953).
NOTES
istence of a union shop in the railroad industry now depends solely up-
on the collective bargaining process.
Although the RLA union shop amendment was patterned after the
LMRA provision, there is one major difference. The railroad provi-
sion expressly prohibits state laws to the contrary from interfering with
union shop contracts.17  The policy of the LMRA, on the other hand,
was not to preempt the field of union security but to allow states to
proscribe compulsory unionism.5" At the present time eighteen states
including eleven from the South have right-to-work laws which outlaw
union shop agreements. "9 These state laws became popular after World
War II, and it has been contended that they were passed for the purpose
of drawing industry away from the northern industrial states where
powerful labor groups and high wages are prevalent. " Because the
LMRA provision allows state right-to-work laws to prevent any union
shop contracts in that jurisdiction, " the policy has been the subject of
much controversy,"2 and there have been attempts to repeal the
57. "Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute
or law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or car-
riers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations duly
designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with the requirements
of this chapter shall be permitted-(a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition
of continued employment, that within sixty days following the beginning of such em-
ployment, or the effective date of such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees
shall become members of the labor organization representing their craft or class. .. ."
Railway Labor Act § 2, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152(llth)
(1952).
58. H. R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 60 (1947). "Nothing in this sub-
chapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements
requiring membership in a labor organizations as a condition of employment in any
State or Territory in which such execution or application is prohibited by State or
Territorial law." Labor Management Relations Act § 14, 49 STAT. 457 (1935), as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1952).
59. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 375 (Supp. 1953); Axiz. CODE AN. § 56-1302 (Supp.
1952) ; ARK. CoirsT. Amend. XXXIV, § 1 (1947); FLA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 12
(1951); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-804 (Supp. 1951); IoVA CODE ANN. § 736A.2 (1946);
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:881-888 (Supp. 1954); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6984.5 (Supp. 1954);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-217 (1952); Nev. Sess. Laws 1953 c. 1 § 2; N. C. GEN. STAT. §
95-81 (1950); N. D. REv. CODE § 34-0114 (Supp. 1953); S. C. CODE §§ 40-46 (Supp.
1954) ; S. D. CODE § 17.1101 (Supp. 1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 11412.8 (Supp. 1952);
TEX. STAT., REV. Civ. art. 5207a, § 2 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-16 (Supp. 1955);
VA. CODE § 40-70 (1950).
60. For a discussion of the campaign of the south to attract industry by means
of right-to-work laws see Cohen, Labor, Taft-Hartley and the Proposed Amendments,
5 LAB. L.J. 391, 403 (1954) ; see also 100 CONG. REc. 6109 (1954).
61. The right-to-work laws were held valid in Lincoln Federal Labor Union' v.
Northwestern Iron and Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); AFL v. American Sash &
Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949). For a discussion of these cases see Notes, 36 VA. L.
REv. 477 (1950) ; 35 CORNELL L.Q. 137 (1949); Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 492 (1949).
62. See Rosenthal, The National Labor Relations Act and Compdsory Unionism,
1954 Wis. L. REV. 53; Witney, Union Security, 4 LAB. L.J. 105 (1953) ; Morgan, Union




Railroads and their employees have traditionally been the subject of
special legislation" because their operations are not reasonably adapted
to regulation by forty eight states. Railroads are direct instrumentalities
of interstate commerce. Disputes in one location of the railroad indus-
try have nation-wide repercussions without parallel in any other industry
in the country. Railroad labor contracts are required to be on a system-
wide basis with a single bargaining unit for each craft or class.65 To
attempt multiple bargaining on a system within one craft or class as a
result of differences in state laws would unnecessarily burden both the
carrier and the union.66 It was argued that there are others, like the
telephone, telegraph, pipeline, trucking, and maritime industries actively
and intimately engaged in interstate commerce, whose union contracts are
nevertheless governed by the LMRA" These industries, however, are
not nearly as complicated in their operation, regulation, and labor struc-
ture as the railroads, and a lesser percentage of their employees actually
move from state to state. The argument as to movement of railroad
workers did not overly impress some legislators because of the fact that
the strongest advocates of union shop were non-operating employees
constituting eighty percent of the railroad industry whose residence and
place of work is as stable as those of men in any industry.6" But, though
these employees do not cross state lines in their work, they are part of
a nation-wide system that cannot be subjected to local interferences.
That Congress had the power to limit the states in their efforts to
ban compulsory unionism was not denied by any of the legislators. This
is an area of interstate commerce where the Federal Government can
exercise exclusive control.6" An attempt was made to add to the RLA
63. See 95 CONG. REc. 8712 (1949); 99 CONG. REC. 5230 (1953); 100 CONG. REC.
6109 (1954).
64. See Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-
164 (1952); Railroad Retirement Act, 49 STAT. 967 (1935), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §
228 (1952); Hours of Service Act, 34 STAT. 1415 (1907), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 61-
66 (1952); Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, 52 STAT. 1094 (1938), as amended,
45 U.S.C. §§ 351-367 (1952) ; Safety Appliances Act, 27 STAT. 531 (1893), as amended,
45 U.S.C. §§ 1-46 (1952); Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 379 (1887), as amended,
49 U.S.C. §§ 1-124 (1952); Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 STAT. 65 (1908), as
amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1952).
65. The National Mediation Board certifies bargaining representatives. 44 STAT.
577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152(9th) (1952). The Board's decision that
there will be a single bargaining unit for each craft on a given system was upheld in
Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 135 F.2d 785 (D.C. Cir. 1943), rev,/d
on other grounds, 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
66. Hearings, supra note 10, at 12.
67. 96 CONG. REc. 16262 (1950).
68. 96 CONG. REc. 16271 (1950).
69. 96 CONG. REc. 16261-62 (1950).
NOTES
a provision similar to that in the LMRA which would allow state laws
to proscribe railroad union shop contracts. By rejecting this proposal
Congress clearly indicated its intent;"0 uniformity was desired in railroad
labor relations and by express statutory provision state laws were not to
prevent railroad labor unions from contracting for a union shop. 1 In
spite of this express provision in the statute and the clear legislative his-
tory there have been attempts to enjoin enforcement of railroad union
shop contracts when in conflict with state right-to-work laws. With one
exception 2 these attempts failed, and the federal act was permitted to
operate without state interference. 73
A more basic problem under railroad union security is that of union
discrimination practices. The brotherhoods have been notorious for
their discriminatory practices, precluding from membership employees
who did not appeal to them or expelling members who displeased them.
The railroad unions, especially the operating brotherhoods, have sys-
tematically excluded negroes from their organizations by constitutional
provision or by the blackball method. Not satisfied with banning the
negro from the unions, some of the operating brotherhoods conducted
a concerted campaign to eliminate the negro entirely from the industry.4
Through ingenious union contracts forced on employers they have at-
tempted to reduce seniority rights of negroes, 75 to make negro firemen
non-promotable and subject to discharge, 6 or even to eliminate negro train
porters as an entire class. 7 7  Instead of using the bargaining authority
under the RLA to bargain for all workers, these unions used their posi-
tion to instigate and preserve discriminatory practices. The Brother-
hood of Locomotive Engineers opposed the union shop amendment fear-
70. 96 CONG. REc. 16371-76 (1950). For LMRA provision see note 58, supra.
71. See note 57 supra.
72. A Nebraska court felt that the federal power to regulate interstate commerce
could not take away from the state the power to prohibit compulsory unionism. It held
that the requirement of union membership violated the First and Fifth Amendments of
the Constitution. Hanson v. Union P. R.R., 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526 (1955). See
40 VA. L. REv. 496 (1954) for a discussion of this case in the lower court.
73. Allen v. Southern Ry., 114 F. Supp. 72 (W.D. N. C. 1953); Sandsberry v.
Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 114 F. Supp. 834 (N.D. Tex. 1953); In re Florida E. C. Ry., 32
L.R.R.M. 2533 (S.D. Fla. 1953); Moore v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 34 L.R.R.M. 2666
(Va. Hustings Ct. 1954); International Association of Machinists v. Sandsberry 227
S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954); Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 24 U.S.L.
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ing resulting pressure would prevent them from selecting their own
members."' A 1952 Presidential Emergency Board, in recommending
that carriers sign disputed union shop contracts, also requested a show-
ing by the non-operating unions that they maintained an open member-
ship."9 This action might explain the operating brotherhoods' reluctance
to obtain union shop contracts.8"
The danger of permitting a union shop to labor organizations
known to be arbitrary and discriminatory Was emphasized by the car-
riers"' and evident to congressmen. 2 A negro or anyone whom the
union opposed should not lose his job in a union shop simply because the
union arbitrarily refused him membership. Neither should the union be
permitted to use the threat of expulsion resulting in automatic discharge
as a method of controlling the actions of its members. To eliminate
these dangers the union shop provision in the RLA states that union
membership is a condition of employment unless membership was de-
nied for some reason other than the failure to meet union financial
obligations.
Though this provision protects his job, the negro in the railroad
industry may legally be denied union membership or be relegated to a
powerless union auxiliary.84 In this manner a negro who wants to join
a union is effectively prevented from taking an active part in collective
bargaining because he has no vote in the selection of his bargaining
78. Hearings, supra note 10, at 193.
79. When the discrimination question was brought up at the emergency board
hearings the non-operating unions claimed good progress toward eradicating discrimina-
tion. Traffic World, Feb. 23, 1952, p. 56.
80. A representative of a union of predominantly negro railroad employees was
asked what would happen if the union shop amendment were enacted. He stated: "It
would be a tremendous incentive toward an acceleration of this trend of opening the
doors of the unions to all members regardless of race, color, or creed." Hearings, supra
note 10, at 70.
81. Hearings, supra note 10, at 120, 123.
82. S. REP. No. 2262, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1950).
83. "Provided, That no [union shop agreement] shall require such condition of
employment with respect to employees to whom membership is not available upon the
same terms and conditions as are generally applicable to any other member or with
respect to employees to whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason
other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and
assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of
acquiring or retaining membership." 44 STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 152
(11th) (a) (1952).
84. The union shop amendment to the RLA does not prevent the unions from de-
termining their own membership requirements. In Taylor v. Brotherhood of Railway &
Steamship Clerks, 106 F. Supp. 438 (D. C. 1952), the union and the railroad had con-
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NOTES
representatives, and he has no voice in making union policy. 5 The non-
member negro may even be blocked from the statutory grievance pro-
cedure because of the adjustment board's policy of hearing only in-
dividual cases supported by the union.8" An open union requirement
was proposed for the RLA, but it was not adopted. Supporters of the
proposal felt that if the railroad brotherhoods wanted to increase their
strength by means of a union shop they should be willing to open
their membership and abandon discriminatory practices." The provision
was defeated by those who felt that it was neither the time nor place to
initiate federal action in this direction.8 '
With the clear intent of establishing a uniform federal policy, Con-
gress permitted the railroad brotherhoods to contract for the union
shop, a valued form of union security.. Having clearly in mind the
long history of discriminatory conduct on the part of these organiza-
tions, Congress sought, at the same time, to insure against any increase
in such practices. That the legislators were not prepared to take more
affirmative steps to preclude such activity indicates merely that they
considered such piecemeal legislation an improper approach to a problem
that is certainly not unique to railroad unions.
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86. See p. 150 supra; Northrup and Kahn, supra note 18, at 374; Comment, 18
U. Cr. L. REv. 303, 311 (1951).
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